

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1963

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0172

EXDIS/ SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON' S STATEMENT OF MAY 4, 1973

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
AT THE MAY 4, 1973 SALT MEETING.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

MAY 4, 1973

MR. MINISTER:

TODAY, AFTER A SHORT RECESS, WE CONTINUE OUR IMPORTANT
NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE AS THEIR PRIMARY GOAL THE WORKING OUT OF
A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OF-
FENSIVE ARMS TO REPLACE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THIS GOAL HAS BEEN
SET FOR US IN ARTICLES VII AND VIII OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THE
SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT TO REPLACE THE
INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AND WOULD MAKE A SIGNIFICANT
CONTRIBUTION TO THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE COMPARABLE
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TO THAT OF THE ABM TREATY.

THE ISSUES WE MUST FACE IN WORKING OUT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ARE COMPLEX, PERHAPS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT THAN THOSE WHICH WERE SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THE ABM TREATY. HOWEVER, THE PROSPECT OF REACHING A PERMANENT AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF THE TWO SIDES AND AT THE SAME TIME REDUCE THE COSTS AND RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH AN UNRESTRAINED ARMS COMPETITION PROVIDES A MAXIMUM INCENTIVE TO PURSUE OUR TASK. GIVEN THE SPIRIT AND DETERMINATION WHICH PRODUCED THE ABM TREATY, OUR EFFORTS HERE SHOULD MEET WITH SUCCESS.

II

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS BEGAN IN 1969 AS A RESULT OF AN AWARENESS IN BOTH COUNTRIES THAT THE SECURITY OF EACH SIDE COULD BE ENHANCED BY MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ARMS LIMITATIONS. THIS MUTUAL INTEREST IN LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS IS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE AWESOME POWER OF THESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUPLED WITH THE IMMENSE CAPABILITIES WHICH EACH SIDE HAS DEPLOYED TO DELIVER THESE WEAPONS.

NOW THAT THE ABM TREATY IS BEHIND US, OUR ATTENTION IS FIXED ON WORKING OUT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE POWER OF THE TWO SIDES CAPABLE OF UPSETTING THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IS CONCENTRATED IN THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS -- ICBM'S SLBMS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS. IT IS THE CENTRAL SYSTEMS WHICH DOMINATE THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AND WHICH PROVIDE THE MAIN INCENTIVE FOR CONDUCTING THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS THE CENTRAL SYSTEMS WHICH SET THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION APART FROM ALL OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, AND WHICH ARE APPROPRIATE FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSION AND LIMITATION. ANY AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST PROVIDE FOR ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE FOR THE TWO SIDES IN THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.

TODAY THERE IS ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN THE CENTRAL SYSTEMS OF THE TWO SIDES. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS EQUIVALENCE WILL BE MAINTAINED FOR THE DURATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, WE ARE NOW NEGOTIATING A PERMANENT AGREEMENT OF INDEFINITE DURATION TO REPLACE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM
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AGREEMENT IN THE FORM IN WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN AGREED, WHILE ACCEPTABLE FOR A TEMPORARY FREEZE, ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

THE PROPOSALS OF THE US SIDE WOULD PLACE EQUITABLE LIMITATIONS ON THOSE SYSTEMS MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTING THE STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. RECOGNIZING THAT THE TWO SIDES WILL NOT NECESSARILY DESIRE IDENTICAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES, THE US PROPOSALS WOULD ALLOW EACH SIDE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE COMPOSITION OF ITS STRATEGIC FORCES. AT THE SAME TIME, THE TWO SIDES WOULD BE LIMITED TO ESSENTIALLY EQUAL STRATEGIC CAPABILITY AND THUS MAINTAIN STRATEGIC STABILITY OVER THE LONG TERM OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THE VALUE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IN PROVIDING TEMPORARY LIMITATIONS ON PORTIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS AND THUS GIVES US TIME.

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TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF ACHIEVING A PERMANENT AGREEMENT TO REPLACE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. ADJUSTMENTS IN FORCES WILL REQUIRE TIME, AND THE PHASING OF THE NEW CEILINGS WOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION AND MUTUAL AGREEMENT. THE CRUCIAL POINT IS THAT THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST PROVIDE FOR ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE, WHICH COULD RESULT IN A SITUATION OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR ONE SIDE, I DO NOT SEE THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

III

DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS THE US SIDE HAS CONDUCTED AN INTENSIVE REVIEW OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE VIEWS OF THE SOVIET SIDE HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY STUDIED AND TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. AS A RESULT OF THIS REVIEW, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THERE CAN BE NO ALTERNATIVE TO ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN CENTRAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. WE BELIEVE OUR PROPOSALS ARE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THIS OBJECTIVE.

I HAVE OUTLINED THE APPROACH OF THE US SIDE TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING THE

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VIEWS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION ON THE SUBJECTS I HAVE DISCUSSED. THE SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO REPLACE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT REPRESENTS A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE TO OUR TWO DELEGATIONS, WHICH WILL REQUIRE MAXIMUM EFFORTS ON BOTH SIDES. IN OUR OPINION, THE FIRST STEP TO PROGRESS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE TO AGREE THAT THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT PROVIDE FOR ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. JOHNSON

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